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Missouri’s Sexually Violent Predator Law:  
Treatment or Punishment? 
Laura Barnickol* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In April of 1987, Kevin Haenchen was arrested for molesting 
more than nineteen children.1 Although Haenchen was only nineteen 
years old, he had been molesting small children for more than three 
years.2 After his arrest, Haenchen pleaded guilty to one count of 
sodomy and two counts of sexual abuse.3 He spent the next eighteen 
months in prison before he was released on probation.4 As part of his 
probation, the state required Haenchen to receive outpatient sex 
offender treatment from a St. Louis mental health clinic.5 During his 
probation, Haenchen molested a two year-old girl he was baby-
sitting.6 As a result, the court revoked Haenchen’s probation and 
resentenced him to ten years in prison.7 Since his second conviction, 
Haenchen has admitted to molesting twenty-eight children, many of 
whom attended a camp and a day care center where Haenchen 
volunteered.8  
At thirty-one years old, Haenchen stated that his desire to molest 
children worsened during his last nine years in prison.9 In frustration, 
he stated: “Look at all the money the prison wasted on me, when I 
was there 10 years . . . [a]nd I’m not any better.”10 Haenchen claimed 
 
 * J.D., Washington University School of Law, 2000. 
 1. William C. Lhotka, Evaluation Will Decide if Molester is a Threat, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH , Apr. 23, 1999, at C2. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Lhotka, supra  note 1. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Lhotka, supra  note 1. 
 10. Kim Bell, Center to Treat Sexual Predators Starts with 1 Committed, 10 Awaiting 
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that because he hated the sex offender treatment offered in prison he 
was unwilling to participate.11 His psychologists estimated that there 
was a 75% probability that Haenchen would re-offend upon release.12 
In fact, Haenchen threatened to continue molesting once released 
from prison; he even threatened to kill his victims in order to 
humiliate state officials.13 Just prior to his commitment under the new 
Sexually Violent Predator law, Haenchen looked forward to 
treatment stating, “I’m safe from people and they’re safe from me.”14 
On July 1, 1999 Haenchen became the first sex offender civilly 
committed under Missouri’s new Sexually Violent Predator Act.15 
Unfortunately, Haenchen’s history of sex offenses is not unique. In 
fact, over one million sex offenders are currently incarcerated in U.S. 
prisons.16 Missouri legislators cited such statistics to justify the 
enactment of the Act, which became effective on January 1, 1999.17 
Missouri legislators enacted the Act with two main goals in mind. 
First, the Act attempts to protect the community from convicted sex 
offenders who have not been successfully rehabilitated in prison.18 
Second, the Act provides inpatient treatment for convicted sex 
offenders in a state-run facility.19 It allows the state to institutionalize 
certain sex offenders following their prison sentence until they are 
able to demonstrate that they are no longer sexually violent predators 
(SVPs).20 Although a large number of individuals are convicted of 
sex offenses each year, the Act targets only the most violent sex 
 
Rulings, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH , July 21, 1999, at A1. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Kim Bell, State Will Try to Block Release of Convicted Child Molester; Prosecutors 
Say He is a “Sexually Violent Predator,” ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH , Apr. 16, 1999, at B1. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Kim Bell, Child Molester Opts for Indefinite Stay in Missouri Psychiatric Clinic; He’s 
First Sexual Predator to do so Under New Law, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH , July 2, 1999, at 
A7. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Madelyn J. Daley, Comment, Do Sexually Violent Predators Deserve Constitutional 
Protections? An Analysis in Light of the Supreme Court’s Ruling in  Kansas v. Hendrick, 521 
U.S. 346 (1997), 23 S. ILL. U. L.J.  715, 715-16 (1999).  
 17. Questions, Answers About Sex Predators and Missouri’s New Law Covering Them , 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH , July 21, 1999, at A10 [hereinafter ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH]. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
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offenders.21  
This Recent Development examines the history and future 
implications of Missouri’s Sexually Violent Predator Act.22 Section II 
describes the development of sexual psychopath laws and sexually 
violent predator statutes by highlighting their apparent strengths and 
weaknesses in light of various constitutional attacks. Section III 
details the provisions of Missouri’s Act and then compares the Act 
with other states’ sexually violent predator statutes. Finally, Section 
IV of this Recent Development considers whether the Act is designed 
to achieve its stated purpose and explores effective alternatives to the 
Act.  
II. THE HISTORY OF SEXUAL PREDATOR LAWS 
A. Sexual Psychopath Laws 
Every state provides for indefinite civil confinement of mentally 
ill individuals who are deemed to be a threat to themselves or the 
safety of others. Mental illness and dangerousness have long been 
prerequisites for, and justifications of, civil commitment in the 
United States.23 Courts rationalize this policy by emphasizing its 
benefit to the individual and the prevention of future crimes.24 
Until recently, however, most states employed strictly punitive 
measures to control the behavior of convicted sex offenders.25 During 
the nineteenth century, states punished individuals convicted of 
raping women or children with death.26 However, widespread support 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 632.480 – 513 (Supp. 1999). 
 23. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) (stating that the state’s burden of 
proof in a civil commitment hearing is clear and convincing evidence of both mental illness and 
dangerousness). See also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (noting that a finding of 
mental illness is critical to civil commitment); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 370 (1983) 
(holding that states may order automatic civil commitment for individuals pleading not guilty 
by reason of insanity until that individual proves they are no longer mentally ill). 
 24. Eric S. Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence: Setting Principled Constitutional 
Boundaries on Sex Offender Commitments, 72 IND. L.J.  157, 160 (1996). 
 25. Jean Peters-Baker, Challenging Traditional Notions of Managing Sex Offenders: 
Prognosis is Lifetime Management, 66 UMKC L. REV. 629, 631 (1998).  
 26. Id. See also Raquel Blacher, Comment, Historical Perspective of the “Sex 
Psychopath” Statute: From the Revolutionary Era to the Federal Crime Bill, 46 MERCER L. 
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for civil commitment of the mentally ill and the social desire to 
protect children and families encouraged states to begin promoting a 
medical model of criminal justice.27 
In the 1930s states began passing sexual psychopath statutes. 
These statutes allowed the commitment of mentally ill individuals 
who were repeat sex offenders.28 The statutes employed civil 
commitment as an alternative to incarceration for individuals with 
psychopathic personalities.29 In addition, these statutes represented 
the criminal justice system’s attempt to incorporate a therapeutic 
approach to rehabilitating criminal disorders.30  
Sexual psychopath statutes were based on four presumptions: (1) 
sexual psychopaths are distinguishable from generic sex offenders; 
(2) individuals commit sexual offenses because of a mental disease; 
(3) mental diseases are treatable and curable; and (4) mental health 
professionals can successfully predict which sex offenders are likely 
to reoffend in the future.31 These statutes required the state to show 
that the sex offender met several criteria before the offender could 
qualify as a sexual psychopath. For instance, the state had to prove 
that the offender had an existing and identified mental disorder.32 In 
addition, the statutes required a judicial determination that the 
offender had a propensity to commit sexual acts.33 Finally, the 
statutes mandated a finding that the individual was dangerous to 
others.34 
In the 1970s, however, several groups called for the repeal of 
sexual psychopath statutes.35 The mental health community criticized 
 
REV. 889, 896-97 (1995).  
 27. Deborah W. Denno, Life Before the Modern Sex Offender Statutes, 92 Nw. U.L. REV. 
1317, 1319 (1998) (“From the late ninet eenth to the mid-twentieth centuries, efforts to promote 
and protect children and the family concentrated on potentially destructive trends and behaviors 
that could impede the societal goal of procreative marriage . . .”). 
 28. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments on the Civil-
Criminal Distinction, With Particular Reference to Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J. 
CONTEMP . LEGAL ISSUES 69, 71 (1996).  
 29. Id. 
 30. Denno, supra  note 27, at 1378-83. 
 31. Schoulhofer, supra  note 28, at 71-72. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Schoulhofer, supra  note 28, at 73. 
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these statutes for using a broad definition of the term “mental 
disorder.”36 At the same time, a political movement supporting 
general deinstitutionalization emerged. The movement was based on 
the widespread belief that commitment under the sexual psychopath 
statutes did not successfully reduce sex offender recidivism.37 As a 
result of this growing criticism, the statutes were used infrequently 
and, in some instances, repealed by state legislatures.38  
In 1986, however, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the 
remaining sexual psychopath statutes in Allen v. Illinois.39 
Additionally, the court held that defendants in civil sexual 
psychopath proceedings were not entitled to the same protections 
afforded to defendants in criminal proceedings, such as the privilege 
against self-incrimination.40 
B. Sexually Violent Predator Statutes 
A second generation of sexually violent predator statutes 
(hereinafter SVP statues) reflects another attempt by state legislatures 
to address the distinct social problems posed by sex offenders.41 
While these laws share many similarities with older sexual 
psychopath legislation, they possess one important difference. Instead 
of using institutionalization as an alternative to incarceration, SVP 
statutes use civil commitment in addition to incarceration.42 
 
 36. Id. at 72-73 (explaining that the “broad definition of mental illness in sexual 
psychopath statutes allows almost any mental aberration or emotional disorder to qualify,” and 
that “more frequently than not, mental illness is deduced primarily, if not solely from the 
commission of the sexually deviant act . . .”). 
 37. Id. at 72. 
 38. Id. 
 39. 478 U.S. 364 (1986) (finding that the sexually dangerous persons statute was correctly 
classified as a civil rather than a criminal statute). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 72. See also  Peters-Baker, supra note 25, at 655 (observing that several states 
use civil commitment statutes as a means of controlling recidivism among sex offenders). 
 42. Janus, supra note 24, at 159. See also  John Q. La Fond, Can Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence Be Normatively Neutral? Sexual Predator Laws: Their Impact on Participants 
and Policy, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 379 (1999). The SVP laws:  
are designed to keep in confinement sex offenders considered at high risk of 
committing a sex crime who have served their criminal sentence and otherwise would 
have to be released from prison. Predator laws contemplate that these sex offenders 
will be confined in secure facilities until there is strong evidence that they no longer 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Therefore, unlike the individuals committed under older sexual 
psychopath statutes, SVP statutes require that individuals be 
convicted of a sexually violent offenses before they can be civilly 
committed.43 Procedurally, after offenders serve their prison 
sentence, they are retried in civil proceedings to determine whether 
they may be classified as SVPs.44 Despite the controversial nature of 
SVP statutes, numerous states have enacted these laws and hundreds 
of sex offenders have been civilly committed in just a few years.45  
Although the details of SVP statutes vary from state to state, their 
general provisions and purposes are similar. Civilly committing a sex 
offender as an SVP begins with a psychological evaluation.46 Just 
before an individual with a history of committing sex offenses is 
released from prison, a psychiatrist or psychologist conducts an 
evaluation. This evaluation determines whether the individual suffers 
from a mental abnormality which makes them likely to reoffend once 
released from prison.47 If the psychologist concludes that the sex 
offender has a mental abnormality and runs a high risk of 
reoffending, the department of corrections and the department of 
mental health refer the offender’s file to the Attorney General.48 The 
 
pose a risk to the public.  
Id. at 379.  
 43. Stuart Scheingold, The Politics of Sexual Psychopathy: Washington State’s Sexual 
Predator Legislation, 15 U. PUGENT SOUND L. REV. 809 (1992).  
 44. Id. 
 45. The following states’ statutes allow civil commitment of a convicted sex offender: 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3701 to 3716 (West Supp. 1999); CAL. WELF. & INST. Code 
§§ 6600-6609.3 (West Supp. 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.21 (West Supp. 2000); ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 207/10-70. (Supp. 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 – 29a20 (Supp. 1999); MINN. 
STAT. § 253B.01-.23 (West 1998 & Supp. 2000); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 632.480-513 (Supp. 
1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.4 (West Supp. 2000); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-48-10 to 44-48-
170 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1999); WASH . REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.010-.902 (West 1993 & 
Supp. 2000); WIS. STAT. Ann. §§ 980.01-.13 (West 1998 & Supp. 1999).  
 46. See Karl A. Menninger, Proof of Qualification for Commitment as a Mentally 
Disordered Sex Offender, 51 AM. JUR. Proof of Facts § 9 (1999).  
 47. Id. §§ 3-4. 
 48. Id. See Andrew D. Campbell, Note, Kansas v. Hendricks: Absent a Clear Meaning of 
Punishment, States Are Permitted To Violate Double Jeopardy Clause, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 87, 
111 (1998). 
Civil commitments for sexually violent predators are initiated when an agency with 
proper jurisdiction provides ninety-day written notice to the Attorney General that 
someone who has been previously convicted of a “sexually violent” offense and may 
meet the criteria of a sexually violent predator is expected to be released from 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol4/iss1/11
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Attorney General, in conjunction with the prosecutor for the county 
where the offense was committed, decides whether to petition the 
state to civilly commit the offender as an SVP.49 If they decide not to 
petition the state, the offender is released from prison at the end of his 
sentence. If a petition is filed, however, the offender is detained until 
the state conducts a probable cause hearing, usually held within 
seventy-two hours of the filing of the petition.50 If the judge finds 
probable cause, the offender awaits trial in the custody of the 
department of mental health in the state’s sexually violent predator 
treatment program.51 
Although SVP trials are civil hearings, defendants in these trials 
receive some of the protections afforded to criminal defendants.52 For 
example, the state’s burden of proof in an SVP trial is proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the same standard the state must meet in a criminal 
trial.53 However, the defendant is not provided with criminal 
protections like the Fifth Amendment privilege against self 
incrimination.54 
At trial, a jury must decide whether the defendant meets the 
statutory criteria required to label the individual a “sexually violent 
predator.”55 If the jury decides that the defendant does not meet the 
criteria, then the defendant is released.56 However, if the jury decides 
that the defendant meets the criteria, then the defendant is indefinitely 
committed to a department of mental health facility for “control, care 
 
confinement.  
Id. 
 49. Id. The Attorney General will appoint a review committee to assess the data on the 
offender to determine whether the offender may be considered an SVP. Id. After determining 
that the offender qualifies as an SVP, the Attorney General may file a petition within seventy-
five days. Id. 
 50. Id. See also Menninger, supra  note 46, § 12 (explaining that “[o]nce the petition is 
filed, the judge determines whether there is probable cause to believe that the person meets the 
commitment criteria . . .”). 
 51. La Fond, supra note 42, at 377. 
 52. Campbell, supra note 48, at 112 (“The trial provides the criminal law protections of a 
jury trial, free counsel for indigent defendant, and the right to call and cross-examine 
witnesses.”). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Menninger, supra note 46, § 12. 
 55. Campbell, supra  note 48, at 112. 
 56. ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH , supra  note 17. 
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and treatment” until such a time that the defendant may safely return 
to the community.57 During this commitment period, the state must 
provide the sex offender with treatment designed to facilitate 
rehabilitation.58 Periodic reviews are available where offenders may 
attempt to demonstrate that they no longer qualify as sexually violent 
predators and request release.59  
The new SVP statutes blend criminal and civil procedure because 
they provide for civil proceedings; as a result, they do not afford sex 
offenders several key constitutional protections.60 For example, SVP 
statutes are not subject to the prohibition against double jeopardy,61 
nor do they violate the constitutional protection against ex post facto 
laws.62 Individuals committed under SVP statutes have challenged 
these laws as being void for vagueness63 and for violating both the 
equal protection64 and the due process clauses.65 
 
 57. Id.  
 58. Menninger, supra note 46, § 13. “The SVP laws provide that a person can be released 
if it can be shown that his mental disorder has changed to the extent that it is safe to release 
him, as he will no longer engage in sexually violent acts.” Id. 
 59. Campbell, supra note 48, at 112. Committed persons are entitled to a yearly review of 
their mental condition. At the time, the court conducts a hearing to determine whether probable 
cause exists “to believe the person’s mental abnormality or personality disorder has so changed 
that the person is safe to be at large and will not engage in acts of sexual violence if 
discharged.” 
Id. 
 60. Daley, supra note 16, at 723-31. See also  In re Anders, 710 N.E.2d 475, 479 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1999) (explaining that “proceedings under the Act are civil, not criminal, in nature and do 
not implicate the respondent’s constitutional right to remain silent” and that the “right to remain 
silent . . . only applies during hearings conducted after the filing of petitions . . .”); In re Tiney-
Bey, 707 N.E.2d 751, 754 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (stating that the “respondent’s constitutional 
right to remain silent is not implicated by the Commitment Act’s psychiatric evaluation 
requirement . . .”). 
 61. Daley, supra note 16, at 719. See also  Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369 (1997) 
(opining that initiation of the commitment proceedings does not constitute a second prosecution 
and that “commitment under the Act is not tantamount to ‘punishment . . .’”).  
 62. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369. The Hendricks Court also found that the Kansas statute 
could not be classified as penal. Therefore, the Court disposed of the defendant’s ex post facto 
argument on the grounds that  the clause pertains “exclusively to penal statutes.” Id. at 370-71. 
The Court also noted that the Kansas Act “clearly does not have retroactive effect” because it is 
based upon an assessment of a respondent’s current mental status, not his mental status at the 
time of his actual conviction. Id. at 371. 
 63. Id. at 360 (rejecting the void for vagueness argument, holding that the term “mental 
abnormality” in the Kansas Sexual Predator Statute was not unduly broad nor subjective for 
purposes of due process).  
 64. See State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 129 (Wis. 1995) (stating that the Wisconsin 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol4/iss1/11
p321 Barnickol.doc  3/22/01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2000]  Sexually Violent Predator Law 329 
 
 
Despite these challenges, courts repeatedly uphold the 
constitutionality of SVP statutes. The Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the Kansas Sexual Predator statute66 in Kansas v. 
Hendricks.67 In its opinion, the Court found that the Kansas statute 
“requires proof of more than just a mere predisposition to violence.”68 
In fact, the Court found that the SVP statute “requires evidence of 
past sexually violent behavior and a present mental condition that 
creates a likelihood of such conduct in the future if the person is not 
incapacitated.”69 In addition, the Court upheld civil commitment laws 
generally because other states also required a finding of 
dangerousness and mental illness or incapacity.70 Therefore, the 
Court likened the Kansas statute to general civil commitment statutes, 
which the Court repeatedly upheld.71  
Following the Supreme Court’s approval of the Kansas SVP 
statute, several hundred men and at least two women have been 
committed under SVP statutes.72 Moreover, few individuals 
committed as sexually violent predators have been released from 
confinement.73 Based on this trend, the number of individuals 
confined under these laws is likely to increase.  
 
Sexually Violent Predator Act does not violate equal protection and that the Supreme Court has 
declined to articulate the appropriate level of scrutiny for involuntary commitment cases). 
 65. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360 (holding that the Kansas Sexual Predator statute did not 
violate substantive due process requirements).  
 66. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to 29a20 (1994). 
 67. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346. 
 68. Id. at 357. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Daley, supra note 16, at 727. 
 72. La Fond, supra note 42, at 380.  
 73. Id. An October 1998 survey estimated that: 
423 individuals have been committed as SVPs to custodial facilities, 14 have been 
committed as SVPs to outpatient status, and 289 individuals have been committed as 
inpatients for evaluation or pending trial . . . Thus it appears that over 700 individuals 
are now in custodial facilities under SVP laws. 
Id. at 380 n.36. 
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III. MISSOURI’S SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR’S ACT 
A. Statutory Definitions 
Missouri’s Sexually Violent Predator’s Act is similar to most 
states’ SVP statutes.74 It defines a sexually violent predator as a 
person with a mental abnormality that makes them likely to engage in 
sexually violent acts if not confined.75 Mental abnormality, the 
critical element of the sexually violent predator definition, is 
statutorily defined as “a congenital or acquired condition affecting 
the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to 
commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person 
a menace to the health and safety of others.”76 The Act also 
specifically enumerates the sexually violent offenses that make an 
individual eligible for commitment.77  
B. Procedure 
Based on these definitions, the Act sets out procedural rules for 
SVP cases. First, the Act provides that within 180 days of a 
previously-convicted sex offender’s release from the department of 
corrections, the state shall provide written notice of the offender’s 
name, offense history, documentation of institutional adjustments, 
 
 74. MO. REV. STAT. § 632.480-513 (Supp. 1999). 
 75. MO. REV. STAT. § 632.480.5. The Act defines a sexually violent predator as: 
[A]ny person who suffers from a mental abnormality which makes the person more 
likely than not to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a 
secure facility and who (a) [h]as plead guilty, or been found guilty, or been found not 
guilty by reason of mental disease or defect pursuant to section 552.030, RSMo, of a 
sexually violent offense; or (b) [h]as been committed as a criminal sexual psychopath 
pursuant to section 632.475, RSMo, and statutes in effect before August 13, 1980.  
Id. 
 76. § 632.480(2).  
 77. § 632.480.4. Sexually violent offenses are defined as:  
[T]he felonies of forcible rape, rape, statutory rape in the first degree, forcible sodomy, 
sodomy, statutory sodomy in the first degree, or an attempt to commit any of the 
preceding crimes, or child molestation in the first or second degree, sexual abuse, 
sexual assault, deviate sexual assault, or the act of abuse of a child . . . which involves 
sexual contact . . . . 
Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol4/iss1/11
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and any treatment received or refused to the attorney general and a 
statutorily defined multidisciplinary team.78 The team, which includes 
the director of the department of mental health and the director of the 
department of corrections, reviews the records of each referred 
individual and, within thirty days, provide an assessment of whether 
the person satisfies the statute’s definition of an SVP.79 When both 
the attorney general and the multidisciplinary team conclude that an 
individual qualifies as an SVP, the attorney general files a petition for 
civil commitment within forty-five days of the date on which the 
attorney general received its written notice.80  
After the petition is filed, the offender receives a probable cause 
hearing where a judge determines whether probable cause exists to 
classify the person as an SVP.81 If the judge finds probable cause, 
then the individual is taken immediately into custody and placed in 
an appropriate, secure facility.82 Within seventy-two hours of 
detainment, the individual has an opportunity to contest the probable 
cause finding.83 If the court upholds its findings of probable cause, a 
psychiatrist or psychologist will conduct a mental health examination 
of the offender.84 Then, within sixty days of the mental health 
evaluation, the court holds a trial to determine whether it should 
 
 78. § 632.483.1(1). The multidisciplinary team is designated by the director of the 
department of mental health and the director of the department of corrections. § 632.483.4. The 
team cannot consist of more than seven members, one of which must be from the department of 
corrections and one from the department of health. Id. In addition, the team may include 
representatives from various other state agencies. Id. 
 79. § 632.483.4. The statute requires the team to notify the attorney general of the results 
of its assessments. § 632.483.5. The attorney general also appoints a five-member prosecutor’s 
review committee. Id. This committee makes their own determination of whether the individual 
satisfies the definition of a sexually violent predator. Id. 
 80. § 632.486. 
 81. § 632.489. 
 82. § 632.489.1. 
 83. § 632.489.2. At this hearing, the detainee has the right to counsel, the right to present 
evidence on his own behalf, the right to cross-examine witnesses, and the right to see a copy of 
all petitions filed by the state pertaining to the case. § 632.489.3(1)-(4). 
 84. § 632.489.4. Individuals may also choose to be examined by a psychiatrist or 
psychologist of their own selection at the individual’s own expense. Id. Each psychiatrist or 
psychologist examining the individual will be given access to all the information provided to 
the multidisciplinary team and any records of the person’s prior offenses. Id. The examining 
doctor is also authorized to interview family members, victims, and witnesses to the offenses. 
Id. This examination must take place within sixty days of its order. Id.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p321 Barnickol.doc  3/22/01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
332 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 4:321 
 
 
commit the individual as an SVP.85 At trial, a jury determines 
whether the individual qualifies as an SVP.86 
Once a jury makes this determination, the offender is “committed 
to the custody of the director of the department of mental health for 
control, care and treatment until such time as the person’s mental 
abnormality has so changed that the person is safe to be at large.”87 
The department of corrections must separately confine SVPs from 
other mental health patients and from other offenders in the 
department’s custody.88 Each SVP is entitled to an annual mental 
health review by the department of mental health and an annual court 
review of their case.89 If, during the annual review, the court finds 
probable cause to believe that the SVP’s mental status has changed 
such that the SVP is no longer a threat to society at large, the court 
holds a hearing on the issue.90 This hearing decides whether the SVP 
will be released from confinement or will be recommitted until safely 
returned to society.  
C. Scope 
The Missouri legislature broadened the scope of the original Act 
through recent amendments. The Act now applies to sex offenders 
who were previously released from prison, as well as those who are 
presently incarcerated. In May 1999 the Act was expanded to include 
two additional types of individuals: (1) those released from prison 
within the last ten years who meet the SVP criteria and (2) those 
individuals who, without committing an actual crime, do something 
sexual in nature to frighten someone else.91 These new provisions 
 
 85. § 632.492. At trial the individual is entitled to assistance by counsel and trial by jury if 
also requested. If the individual is indigent, the court appoints counsel. § 632.492. 
 86. § 632.495. The state’s burden of proof is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In 
addition, the jury’s decision must be unanimous. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. An SVP must be confined in a secure facility and “shall be segregated at all times 
from any other patient under the supervision of the director of the department of mental health.” 
Id. 
 89. § 632.498. 
 90. § 632.501. The attorney general represents the state’s interests and must prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the SVP’s mental status remains unchanged. § 632.501. 
 91. Kim Bell, New Commitment Bill is Untested by Courts; Measure Targets Predators 
After Their Release From Prison; Critic Says it’s Likely to be Rejected, ST. LOUIS POST-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol4/iss1/11
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differ from anything found in other state SVP statues and have not 
yet been adjudicated by the courts.92 These provisions allow the state 
to require an individual currently living in society who previously 
pleaded guilty to a sex offense or has a prior sex offense conviction 
to undergo an evaluation if he commits “a recent overt act.”93 “A 
recent overt act” includes any act creating a “reasonable apprehension 
of harm of a sexually violent nature.”94 Therefore, the Act now 
reaches the hundreds of sex offenders who have been returned to 
society and allows the state to “go after someone if law enforcement 
thinks they know of someone (on the street) who is a dangerous 
predator.”95 
D. Purpose of and Rationale for the Act 
The Act’s proponents assert that its purpose is both to protect the 
public at large from the continuing threat posed by SVPs and to treat 
SVPs who will someday return to society.96 Furthermore, proponents 
note that commitment under the Act requires more than just the 
state’s desire to prevent sex offender recidivism. The state must also 
demonstrate that the offender has a mental disorder causally related 
to his dangerous conduct.97 Therefore, the Act is predicated upon the 
notion of treatment rather than punishment.98  
Proponents cite the high rate of recidivism among sex offenders as 
 
DISPATCH , May 16, 1999, at A1. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. The law provides nine days for the department of mental health to evaluate the 
person. 
 95. Id. According to statistics provided by the Missouri Department of Corrections:  
[O]ne hundred sixty-four sexual offenders were released from prison before 1995, and 
remain under the supervision of the state parole board. About 180 have been released 
since 1995 and are under state supervision. Nearly 700 sexual offenders were released 
from prison before 1995 and are no longer under any form of supervision. 
Id. 
 96. ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH , supra  note 17. 
 97. Id. See also Schulhofer, supra  note 28, at 77 (noting that SVP statutes require more 
than just a demonstration of an antisocial personality; the state must demonstrate the existence 
of a personality disorder). 
 98. ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH , supra note 17. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p321 Barnickol.doc  3/22/01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
334 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 4:321 
 
 
another rationale for the Act.99 They argue that sex offenders present 
a high risk both to themselves and to society at large. Proponents 
assert that the Act was designed to enable individuals with a mental 
disorder to make a successful transition back into society by 
providing them with necessary treatment.100 The Act also provides an 
incentive for convicted sex offenders to utilize the available 
treatments while they are incarcerated in order to avoid civil 
commitment upon release.101 In addition, many proponents of the Act 
believe that sex offenders are readily distinguishable from other 
offenders. They argue that experts can predict sexual recidivism and 
identify those sex offenders who can safely be returned to the 
community. Furthermore, proponents say that the Act only targets the 
most serious sex offenders, those offenders who pose the greatest 
threat to society.102 Consequently, they argue that the Act is limited in 
scope and that the state does not intend to apply it broadly to all sex 
offenders.103  
The perceived ineffectiveness of the treatment that sex offenders 
receive in prison also supports the Act’s rationale.104 Many sex 
offenders are unwilling to undergo any treatment while they are 
incarcerated105 and never participate in the treatment programs 
available to them during their incarceration. As a result, sex offenders 
commonly complete their sentences without receiving any treatment 
at all.  
State officials also defend the Act by citing current and projected 
statistics of the Act’s impact on sex offenders. Currently, Missouri 
prisons hold 3,379 sex offenders.106 However, because the Act is 
 
 99. Scheingold, supra  note 43, at 812 (citing statistics that 48% of all sex offenders were 
rearrested after release and 51.5% of all rapists were rearrested after release).  
 100. ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH , supra  note 17.  
 101. Kevin Murphy, ‘Stephanie’s Law’ Signed by Governor in Missouri; ‘Sexually Violent 
Predators’ are Focus of Safety Legislation, KAN. CITY STAR, July 3, 1998, at A1. 
 102. Stephen Chapman, Sexual Predators Should be Confined, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
June 27, 1997, at 7B.  
 103. Kansas, for example, only committed nine of the 805 sex offenders who completed 
their sentences in 1997. Id.  
 104. Bell, supra  note 14. Kevin Haenchen, the first man to be committed under the Act, felt 
that the state denied him adequate mental health care during his prison sentence. Id. 
 105. Id. Department of corrections officials said that Haenchen refused to participate in sex 
offender treatment while in prison. Id. 
 106. ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH , supra  note 17. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol4/iss1/11
p321 Barnickol.doc  3/22/01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2000]  Sexually Violent Predator Law 335 
 
 
designed to target only those offenders deemed to also have a mental 
abnormality, the state has committed only one individual under the 
Act107 and ten more are awaiting trial.108 State officials estimate that 
under the current plan forty-five offenders will be committed as SVPs 
each year.109 The Department of Mental Health estimates that 150 
SVPs will be committed to the state’s new sex offender treatment 
facility by 2002.110  
IV. MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT OR PROSPECTIVE 
INCARCERATION? 
The Act’s purpose and rationale stimulates much controversy. 
Proponents claim that the Act is designed to facilitate mental health 
treatment for sex offenders. In contrast, opponents contend that the 
Act is actually a form of prospective incarceration that represents an 
unconstitutional abuse of power. 
A. Proponents: The Act Provides Mental Health Treatment to Sex 
Offenders 
One of the primary arguments in favor of the Act is that it 
effectively protects the public from sex offenders prone to 
recidivism.111 The Act’s proponents link offender recidivism to the 
lack of treatment available to, and utilized by, sex offenders while 
they are incarcerated. In addition, the poor prognosis for curing sex 
offenders and the long-term treatment needs of sex offenders further 
justify proponents’ arguments in favor of the Act.112 Therefore, the 
 
 107. Bell, supra  note 10. 
 108. Id. 
 109. ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH , supra  note 17. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Scheingold, supra  note 43, at 812. 
 112. Schulhofer, supra note 28, at 74-75. SVP statutes reflect: 
the legislature’s perception that sexually violent offenders pose distinct problems that 
cannot be addressed through the state’s ordinary regime for civil commitment. The 
legislative findings. . . [indicate] that SVPs, unlike the ordinary subjects of civil 
commitment, do not have a “mental disease or defect that renders them appropriate for 
the existing involuntary treatment act. . . .”[T]he treatment needs of this population are 
very long term, and the treatment modalities for this population are very different than 
the traditional treatment modalities for people appropriate for commitment under the 
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Act attempts to help provide long-term care and treatment 
specifically tailored to the needs of those sex offenders who do not 
receive treatment while they are incarcerated. In turn, this treatment 
helps sex offenders successfully reintegrate themselves into society. 
The Act requires that sex offenders be committed to mental 
institutions rather than incarcerated in prison during their civil 
commitment. Proponents argue that the Act is not significantly 
different from other involuntary commitment statutes.  
Furthermore, the Act is intended only to affect a small percentage 
of incarcerated sex offenders. Its goal is to reach those offenders with 
a high chance of recidivism and those who have committed the most 
heinous sex offenses. This eligibility restriction for commitment 
under the Act is consistent with a rehabilitative objective. Whereas 
penal statutes are targeted at a broad population, only a small portion 
of the public, those sex offenders with serious untreated mental 
disorders, fall within the scope of the Act.  
B. Opponents: The Act Legitimizes Incarceration Without Crime 
Not suprisingly, the Act’s critics maintain that rehabilitation is not 
its primary goal. Instead, they assert that the Act is punitive in nature 
because it creates a form of prospective incarceration.113 Critics argue 
that the Act attempts to confine previously-convicted sex offenders 
for crimes the state suspects they will commit in the future. In 
addition, opponents worry about the precedent that the Act and its 
counterparts in other states will set. Kansas v. Hendricks left open the 
possibility that other states will enact laws which, despite their noble 
purpose, severely abridge the constitutional rights of unpopular 
 
involuntary treatment act. 
Id. 
 113. Campbell, supra  note 48, at 124. Campbell notes that in Kansas v. Hendricks the 
majority failed to recognize that: 
[The Kansas statute,] considered in its entirety, is clearly punitive in nature. In 
concluding that Kansas’s regime of committing “sexually violent predators” for “very 
long” terms does not constitute punishment, the majority misinterprets the “clearest 
proof” standard which has been applied in previous cases and also ignores 
fundamental notions of what constitutes the core of punishment, namely moral blame. 
Id. 
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groups.114  
Another criticism of the Act is that it represents an abuse of the 
involuntary civil commitment statute. Many sex offenders who will 
be confined under the Act have personality disorders which are not 
diagnosable, treatable mental illnesses.115 Consequently, indefinite 
commitment may not solve the sex offender’s mental health 
problems. In addition, critics note that sex offenders are a diverse 
group and often commit multiple types of crime.116 This complicates 
the ability of researchers and clinicians to accurately predict the 
likelihood that an individual will reoffend117 and raises further 
questions about the success of programs used to treat sex offenders 
under the Act.118  
Moreover, the methods used to treat sex offenders are inconsistent 
with the methods used in other involuntary commitment cases 
because they may not actually facilitate the treatment of the sex 
offender. As a result, the Act could be used indiscriminately and 
applied beyond the limited scope of the statute. Furthermore, critics 
view the Act as an abuse of state mental health systems. The mental 
health system has a distinct and valuable purpose independent of the 
state correctional system. The state should not use the system as a 
dumping ground for those criminal offenders who serve their time in 
prison but are still considered dangerous to society.  
Finally, the recent amendments to the Act compound the potential 
for abuse. Legislation that authorizes the civil confinement of 
individuals who have not been convicted of any crimes since their 
release from prison sets a dangerous precedent. 
 
 114. Michelle Johnson, The Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and the Sentencing of Sexual 
Predators, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.  39, 83 (1998) (“Given this precedent, states could 
conceivably enact other ‘civil’ statutes to keep other repeat offenders—or even first-time 
offenders who are considered dangerous and mentally unbalanced—in prison.”). 
 115. Charles Krauthammer, Don’t Incarcerate Without Crime, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
Dec. 15, 1996, at 3B.  
 116. Scheingold, supra  note 43, at 813 (“Sex offenders are often involved in other types of 
crimes, including violent, as well as nonviolent, nonsex crimes.”). 
 117. Id. “Given the variations among sexual offenders and the lack of explanations to 
account for their behaviors, prediction would seem to be a rather chancy enterprise.” Id. 
 118. Id. “According to a review . . . of forty-two treatment studies, clinical treatment has 
not been demonstrated to reduce recidivism rates for sex offender populations.” Id. 
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C. Additional Problems With Indefinite Civil Commitment 
This type of civil commitment and related treatment plans come 
with a high price. State officials expect the Act to cost a minimum of 
$40,000 per offender, per year.119 These costs will burden an already 
financially-stressed public mental health system.120 The cost of civil 
confinement is three times the cost of what the state currently spends 
to keep sex offenders incarerated.121 In addition, the county which 
convicts the sex offender is responsible for the cost of civil 
commitment after release from prison. This could present serious 
long-term financial problems for small rural counties. The state also 
may find it difficult to develop sufficient resources to successfully 
implement Act for the long term. For example, the state currently 
houses sex offenders in a twenty-five bed wing of a medium security 
correctional facility.122 However, this facility is likely to fill up 
quickly, forcing the state to construct an additional facility to house 
the growing number of sex offenders committed under the Act.123 
Thus, the Act’s economic demands require the development of more 
financially viable alternatives for the future. 
D. Alternatives to Indefinite Civil Commitment 
States should develop alternative treatment plans to address these 
concerns. First, states should implement individualized treatment 
plans as soon as a sex offender’s prison sentence begins. States could 
base these treatment schedules on information compiled from lie-
detector tests and penile plethysmograph tests, a test which measures 
sexual arousal.124 Doctors and therapists could utilize this information 
to develop individualized treatment to best accommodate the specific 
needs of each sex offender. Other techniques, like group therapy and 
individual counseling, could establish a well-rounded rehabilitation 
 
 119. Bell, supra  note 10. 
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Bell, supra note 10. 
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program.125 
Plans to address cost inefficiencies in the current penal system 
may also provide successful alternatives. Additional research that 
pinpoints which sex offenders are amenable to treatment will help the 
state determine those offenders best suited for incarceration and those 
best suited for treatment. In addition, linking an inmate’s progression 
in treatment to prison release may encourage sex offenders to 
participate in the treatment programs provided in prison. 
Furthermore, increasing prison sentences for sex offenses and re-
examining prison sex offender treatment programs are also necessary 
to facilitate rehabilitation while the offender is still incarcerated. 
Finally, identifying juvenile offenders who are at high risk for 
committing sex offenses may combat some of the problems with the 
current system. Most offenders exhibit long histories of sexually 
violent behavior, some dating from childhood. Therefore, identifying 
these individuals earlier in life can assist states’ efforts in preventing 
future crimes. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
At first blush, the goal of the Missouri Sexually Violent Predator 
Law appears to be rehabilitation. Legislators applaud the effort to 
treat mentally-disturbed sex offenders and facilitate their 
reintegration in to society. However, upon closer review, it appears 
that rehabilitation under Missouri’s SVP law comes with a significant 
price.126 While rehabilitation is an admirable goal, more effective 
means of achieving rehabilitation exist. Missouri’s SVP law 
represents an example of legislatures needlessly restricting individual 
constitutional rights in order to implement larger policy objectives 
and establishing a dangerous precedent for future legislation. 
 
 125. The director of the state’s sexually violent predator treatment program believes that 
with proper treatment, offenders who take their rehabilitation seriously may be released 
someday. Id. 
 126. Scheingold, supra note 43, at 810. “[S]exual predator provisions lead in an 
incapacitative direction – that is, they are designed to predict which offenders are so dangerous 
that they must be more or less permanently institutionalized to protect  the society.” Id. 
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